While it has long been apparent that Turkey has started to slip its western moorings and turn eastward, only now is it becoming clear how instability in Turkey radiates through a region in turmoil, amplified by an EU turned inwards, and a US whose policies are turned upside down by Donald Trump.
Turkey’s spat with Germany — Berlin lambasted the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Chancellor Angela Merkel’s chief-of-staff, Peter Altmaier, called Ankara’s behaviour “unacceptable” after Turkish police arrested a German in a swoop on human rights activists — is escalating into a feud. But Turkey’s relations with other Nato partners are just as inflammatory.
The way President Trump triggered the crisis between a Saudi Arabian-led camp and Turkey’s ally Qatar is one thing, putting at risk America’s biggest base in the Middle East. But the US, and France and Britain, by relying on Syrian Kurdish militia to fight Isis in Syria and Iraq, are jeopardising Nato’s access to Incirlik air base in southern Turkey (from which Germany has moved its contingent to Jordan after Ankara obstructed German MPs’ visits).
Turkish-backed rebels are already fighting the US-led anti-Isis coalition’s proxies in Syria. Last week, Turkey’s state news agency took the extraordinary step of revealing the position of 10 US bases in Kurdish areas of northern Syria, with maps and troop numbers.
Turkey entered a tactical alliance with Russia and Iran on the rebound from the Kurdish dispute with western allies. It is being pushed further into their embrace, along with Qatar. This latter dispute, ostensibly separate, cuts Turkey off from the Sunni camp Ankara has sought to lead, and could end by weakening it while courting further internal destabilisation.
Turkey is still working through the fallout of last summer’s coup attempt, which President Erdogan and his Justice and Development party blame on a network infiltrated into the army and the state by Fethullah Gulen, leader of a shadowy Islamist cult and an erstwhile ally. Arrests have decimated the military, purged ministries, universities, schools and media, leading to more than 100,000 dismissals and 50,000 jailed. But the country is also under assault by Isis and the insurgency of the Kurdistan Workers’ party (PKK), to which the US-backed Syrian Kurdish fighters are tied.
What if Iran or Saudi Arabia, already warring by proxy across a region consumed by the Shia-Sunni power struggle, decide to fish in these troubled waters as well? The west at times seems resigned to losing Turkey, watching as it disappears into the Eurasian spider’s web being spun by Vladimir Putin’s Russia. The EU bears special responsibility. Once a strategic anchor and engine of reform for Turkey, EU members started obstructing Turkish entry a decade ago and have blown hot and cold ever since — warming to Ankara mostly when needing help, such as holding back the tides of Syrian refugees heading for Europe.
President Erdogan, for his part, empowered after winning April’s constitutional referendum, enabling him to rule unchecked by any balance of powers, would prefer to keep EU economic ties without bothersome political constraints and judicial oversight. That is delusional as long as the rupture with Europe (as well as Nato) is accelerating.
Turkey’s economy is vulnerable, especially through its dependence on cheap credit. Question marks hang over the rule of law, such as the seizure of almost 1,000 private companies after the coup, and are deterring investment. Foreign and defence policy looks increasingly improvised, connected by the single thread of Kurdish advances south of Turkey’s borders emboldening the PKK inside them. As Syrian Kurds take the Isis stronghold of Raqqa, and Iraq’s self-governing Kurds hold a referendum on independence in September, Turkey may be tempted to lash out.
Germany and Turkey are close to retaliating against each other through sanctions, with Berlin reviewing arms sale licences and Ankara allegedly drawing up blacklists of German companies in Turkey. Yet the EU should still have some leverage.
Both sides, with cooler heads, may see the value of defence and counter-terror co-operation, and greater EU engagement with the Kurdish problem, which Turkey sees as existential. EU entry is off the table. But Brussels should push ahead, after German elections in September, with a radical upgrade of the customs union with Turkey — the rules for which could help shore up a crumbling rule of law. If the relationship with Turkey is going to be transactional, then make the bargains worth something.
Letter in response to this column:
It would be bad mistake to ‘re-engage’ with Turkey / From Andrew Rosenbaum, Larnaca, Cyprus
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