It is hard to exaggerate the importance of the rejection of prime minister Theresa May’s Brexit withdrawal treaty in the House of Commons on Friday. Control — if such a thing ever existed — has now passed to the leaders in the European Council. The only unilateral option for Britain now would be outright revocation of Brexit. But parliament also rejected that plan during last week’s series of indicative votes.
What will the European Council do if Mrs May again fails to push her deal through? Notice the inverse relationship in expectations in Brussels and London about the chances of a no-deal Brexit. British commentators seem to regard no deal as a tail risk. Some European officials call it the most likely outcome.
Are they scaremongering? I do not think so. We don’t know what the council will decide if asked to extend the deadline yet again when it meets next week. But we do know what they decided 10 days ago, and how their debate developed.
Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union says they must decide by unanimity. But do not think of the council as a voting chamber. The veto matters for the dynamics of the debate, but nobody flashes a red card with the word “veto” written on it. The council did not accept Mrs May’s request for an extension until June 30, but discussed several dates before settling on April 12 — the last date by which the UK government must give legal notice over whether it will hold EU elections.
They also set out two preconditions for a long extension. The first is that the UK would have to participate in European elections on May 23. The second is the demand that the UK would have to propose a political way forward.
This condition is less concrete but no less important. If Mrs May were to enter the room with only the promise of yet another meaningful vote, EU leaders would send her home. General elections would qualify as a reason to extend. A second referendum might, but would also raise difficult issues. What will the question be? What side will Mrs May campaign on? And her successor? The chances that she could give satisfactory answers to these questions are zero.
At this point, the discussion would very likely move in another direction. Perhaps someone will ask: what if the results of the second referendum confirmed the first? Would it not be better for the EU to pull the plug now, rather than risk being drawn into a black hole?
The council will also consider the consequences of Mrs May’s potential resignation. Imagine the idea of prime minister Boris Johnson from a European perspective. He would become a full voting member in the council. On April 10, the leaders would have the unique opportunity to stop this. Hard to deny the temptation.
A lot is at stake for the leaders. The main centre-left and centre-right groups in the European Parliament will lose their joint majority for the first time. Coalition building will become more important. Emmanuel Macron, the French president, is not part of either group, and is keen to increase his leverage in European politics. If the UK were to leave, 27 of its 73 seats in the European Parliament would be distributed. The two biggest net gainers would be France and Spain with five additional seats each. Unsurprisingly, both countries are among those most sceptical about a long extension.
If the UK were forced to hold EU elections, Mr Macron would be affected in two ways. With five fewer votes available to France, he would compete for a smaller share of the pie. And he has no strong UK allies. Labour MEPs would remain in the group of the Socialists and Democrats, while Tories and Ukip members would be scattered among Eurosceptic and nationalist groups. Mr Macron has nothing to gain from the UK taking part in the elections.
Yet there are two arguments why EU leaders might agree to a long extension. First, the council traditionally never misses a chance to kick the can down the road. Extensions are in their DNA.
Second, those minded to pull the plug will have to confront criticism that they damage the EU’s strategic interests — on the grounds that the EU would be weaker without the UK as a member in the long run. EU leaders will surely, and rightly, take this argument seriously.
But they will also ask themselves: would a frustrated Brexit really make them stronger and more united? Would the next UK prime minister — a Tory Eurosceptic or Jeremy Corbyn, the Labour leader — make a positive contribution to the strategic issues the EU has to yet to confront? Or would the EU be trapped in endless debates about Brexit and UK contributions to the European budget?
Only a fool would predict what they will decide. But there are rational and strategic arguments against extension. Can we be sure that nobody will make them?
Copyright The Financial Times Limited . All rights reserved. Please don't copy articles from FT.com and redistribute by email or post to the web.